If there is no such thing as a European Public Sphere (EPS), why don't we construct one? The answer seems to be obvious: There is no way one could construct a public sphere top-down since it depends on the active participation of speakers, the media and audience. In a democratic society they are free to deliberate with whom and about what they want. This article does not challenge the Habermasian notion of a public sphere evolving from the free discourse of the citizens. Nevertheless, the evolution of a public sphere is also structured by incentives and constraints imposed from above. The European Union structures the EPS -as a polity as well as through its policies and politics.
INTRODUCTION *
During the last fifty years the European nation states have transferred much of their power to common supranational institutions and to mechanisms of intergovernmental decision-making. At the same time, the European Union still lacks democratic legitimacy.
Attention has therefore shifted towards the crucial link between the EU and its citizens: a European Public Sphere (EPS) 1 . This has lead to the discovery of a new black hole in the EU universe closely linked to the legitimacy deficit and the democratic deficit of the EU: the "communication deficit" (Meyer 1999 ).
The public sphere is generally seen as something that evolves from the free discourse of citizens. This article looks at the incentives and constraints imposed on the public sphere from above through the nature of the European Union as a polity and a number of its policies drawing on the most recent literature as well as various policy documents and more than 30 interviews conducted in Brussels and with the offices of the Commission and the European Parliament in several member states. While different policies such as media policy and all cultural policies matter for the public sphere, the Commission's information policy shall be analyzed in more detail as it constitutes the most explicit link between the institution and the EPS. Seven different strategies of information policy will be presented which vary in their potential of creating or suppressing the evolution of a democratic public sphere. This framework will be applied to the information policy of the Commission in order to locate it between the poles of propaganda and arcane policies on one hand and transparency and dialogue on the other hand.
The Commission's information policy turns out to be not static over the years but rather shifting towards a new policy paradigm. This is to be explained against the background of a gradual transformation of the state as it is analysed at the Collaborative Re- This short form will be used in the text for European Public Sphere which is understood as a set of interconnected Europeanized public spheres.
2
The Collaborative Research Center (CRC 597) "Transformations of the State" in Bremen sponsored by the German Research Foundation (DFG) analyses this structural change transforming the "Democratic Constitutional Interventionist State (DCIS)". One dimension of this research program is the democratic quality of the state and the question of legitimation. Attempts to construct a European public sphere should also be seen as a tool aimed at a
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-2 -doubts about its legitimacy and demands for more transparency and openness. National media are looking much more closely at the EU, its policies and institutions. 3 This happens in the context of the alleged evolution of an information society.
THE EU -DISCOVERING AN "UNPUBLIC" SPHERE
In order to tackle the questions of constructing a public sphere, the term European Public Sphere (EPS) needs to be defined. This article follows the widely accepted suggestions of Gerhards (1993) that the EPS, if it exists, can only take the shape of an Europeanization of the national public spheres. Following a Habermasian understanding of the public sphere 4 , I suggest to analyze the EPS as network of Europeanised public spheres connected by information flows. 5 The base of this network is the distinct space of communication that Europe has been for ages (Kleinsteuber / Rossmann 1994) . The hypothesis of Europeanization implies that the process of European integration has led to a re-orientation of the relevant actors in the public sphere (speakers, audience and media).
6
Much of the debate still centres around defining the necessary and sufficient conditions for measuring the existence of an EPS. Three schools of thought can be distinguished. Firstly, what I would call the "impossibility school" applied the model of a unitary national public sphere to the European arena: A European Public Sphere cannot exist because there is a lack of common language, European media, European civil society, European identity and demos (Grimm 1995; Kielmannsegg 1996) . A transnational public sphere was seen as "a contradiction in terms" (Kunelius/Sparks 2001, 11 Cf. the definitions of the public sphere by Habermas (1992, 436); Peters (1994, 45) and Gerhards (1998, 694) .
5
The network metaphor has become quite common to describe modern society in general. Schlesinger e.g. sees the EU as a "Euro-networking polity" (Schlesinger 2003) .
6
"Europeanization is an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making" (Ladrech 1994, 69 It has become consensus to see the EU as a multi-level-system. The EU also is multi-level-democracy as there are elements of democratic governance on all levels of the system since the introduction and gradual empowerment of the European Parliament.
9
The 1979 turn-out was 67 per cent and has been falling with each election ever since.
What can the EU do to change its un-publicity? First of all, it has to be aware of the potential impact that policy-making and "polity-making" 10 have on the capacities of the EPS. On the one hand, structural changes in the polity "EU" evoke repercussions in the public sphere. On the other hand, a number of policies touch the public sphere, namely the information policy of the Commission. The Commission's substitute for a public forum was the website "On the Future of Europe" 11 . It offered a forum to every citizen where he or she can present his or her vision of the EU. More than 2600 messages and contributions were exchanged within less than a year. 12 Nevertheless, the Convention has not generated the public awareness adequate to the significance of the enterprise of constitution-making: A big stone was thrown into the water but it created some rather small circles.
Making the constitution subject to referenda affects the EPS: supporters and opponents of the treaty speak up to convince the people of their respective goals. Nevertheless, referenda do only stimulate the public sphere if political actors pro-actively campaign for a certain outcome. This was the case in France before the referendum on the constitution but it was for example not the case before the first Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty. In Ireland EU-supporters failed to mobilize their share of the population and participation came down to the level of 35 per cent (Sinnott 2001 ).
The parlamentarization of the supranational power is another institutional reform model with potential leverage for the EPS. The members of the EP have a much greater impetus to make their work public than Commission officials since they need to mobilize their voters. So far, however, the EP has not succeeded in installing itself as the public forum and heart of the EU-democracy. Yet, there are examples of the power the par- 10 The term "polity-making" (in contrast to policy-making) is introduced to describe the process of constructing the European polity itself, i.e. the making of the constitution, institutional questions etc. 
Policy-Making: The EU's Approach to Culture, Language and Media
Any policy pursued in public may structure the public sphere since it might become a major topic, which is discussed in the media, or it touches the lifes of the citizens and inevitably becomes a topic discussed in the streets -the best example of the latter being the Euro. Each policy might as well be accompanied by a strategically constructed policy narrative and information campaign. This notwithstanding, there are policies which are more explicitly linked to the public sphere than the classical sectoral European policies such as agriculture. All policies related to culture are closely related to the public sphere as will be shown below. Most obviously, policies fostering the knowledge of foreign languages and policies regulating the media or communication technologies are also related to the public sphere. One policy, however, is explicitly linked to the public sphere as it concerns the aims and means of institutional information and will therefore be in the centre of this article: information policy.
It is common to all these policies that the Commission's scope for action is very limited since competences remain on the national level and the aims of the Commission's activities are only narrowly or ambivalently defined in the treaties.
Cultural Policy: Invention of Europeanalism
The current version of the Treaty establishing the European Community states: "The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore" (Art. 151). The Union's role consequently is to promote diversity and unity at the same time. The activities of the EU are limited to promoting cooperation among the Member States and to supplement national policies, also in the field of "improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples". Funding is still very limited, the EU's significance for culture mainly derives from side effects from other policies such as market regulation.
Having said that, the EU pursues -at least to a certain extent -the "invention of Europeanalism" by following the classical recipe of the "invention of Nationalism" as it was presented by authors such as Hobsbawm (1991) and Anderson (1983) . This recipe comprises an elite-driven approach to invent symbols and traditions, promoting a common language and employing strategies of inclusion and exclusion to consolidate the group identity. "The new Europe is being constructed on much the same symbolic terrain as the old nation-states of the last two centuries" Shore writes ( 14 This is relevant for the EPS since a common identity and a growing intensity of com- 14 The new "European Anthem" is a good example of reinterpretating history. It was originally dedicated to Friedrich Wilhelm, the Third of Prussia. The German text by Schiller is left aside. For a detailed analysis of this kind of cultural politics see Shore (2000) and the research paper "The use of nationalist strategies by the European Union" by Balthas Seibold (1999) 
Media Policy: Between Market and Culture
European media policy is another relevant factor shaping the EPS -but again supranational powers in this area are very limited. The fundamental normative base of all EU media policy will be the embodiment of the freedom of the media in the upcoming con- 2004, 196 final, 19) . Another idea that is currently circulating in Brussels is the introduction of a EU TV channel which is oriented at the American C-Span which reports live and real-time from Congress.
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EUROPEAN INFORMATION POLICY Public Relations, Information Policy or Policy Information?
Information policy is the political activity most explicitly linked to the EPS and an area where research is deeply needed. Therefore an analytical framework shall be introduced before proceeding with a more detailed analysis. The term 'information policy' is used by the Commission itself but is not explicitly defined. The term might arouse suspicions among political and communication scientists since information is not one of the classical policy fields and it is not a priori evident why one should talk about information policy instead of public relations.
Information touches upon any policy since any policy is accompanied by its own "policy narrative" (cf. Radaelli 2000) . Therefore, policy analysis sees information as one instrument of policy-making somewhere between strong regulatory and voluntary measures (Howlett / Ramesh 1995, 82) . This article proposes to analyse information as 16 There is disagreement among scholars, whether the Commission is only interested in deregulation or whether the Commission actually cares about a public sphere which meets not only market but also democratic standards. The position of the Commission might be best described as swinging between the two poles (Cf. Kleinsteuber / Rossmann (1994) ; Kleinsteuber (2001); Ward (2001) ).
17 The "Television without Frontiers Directive" (from 1989, amended in 1997) demands that TV broadcasters, in
principle, reserve a majority of airtime for European programmes. 18 A basis for such a programm would be the existing EU news service "Europe by Satellite" which offers daily coverage of EU events via satellite -but mainly as a source for other TV stations. The long-term idea of "Channel Europe" has already found its way into the Commission's strategy papers (European Commission 2004, 18) a policy: To give or deny information, to just respond to demands or to pro-actively inform the citizens, to guarantee a right to information, to advertise or to explain policies, to centralise information in an information office or to spread it over all government agencies -all of this demands political decisions. This set of decisions constitutes the field of information policy.
It is not just a technical question of how to do professional and effective public relations work. 19 To use the term information policy means putting public relations into a wider perspective. The term information policy is appropriate in that it admits that informing the citizens is not a technical exercise dominated by the instrumental question 19 Public Relations comprises all professional efforts to reach the public via the media (press work and advertisements) or directly (information leaflets, public discussions, etc.). The most prominent definition of PR sees it as part of the communication management between an organisation and its publics (Grunig / Hunt 1984, 6 ). This definition evokes the idea that PR is a politically neutral organisational task. The technocratic idea of "management" is not adequate in the context of political institutions: The Commission pursues an information policy and part of this policy might be hiring a PR consultant who serves a politically defined purpose.
A Framework for Analysing European Information Policies
The model presented below (see figure 1) suggests to analytically separate seven strategies for information policy. 21 These strategies differ on two dimensions: 1. Does information policy rather open up access to information or does it pro-actively reach out to people in order to give a political message? 2. Is the communicative and power relationship between the government and the people rather symmetric or asymmetric?
Information policy might vary in its democratic quality. In contrast to transparent policy and dialogue which would be components of a deliberative democracy, arcane policy and propaganda would be the methods of choice of authoritarian regimes. Of course, even in democracies there will always be issues that cannot be dealt with in public. There will also always be attempts to get away with propaganda. The question is which strategy of information policy is prevalent. The communicative power relation in between the institution and the public varies between being very asymetric in the case of propaganda and symmetric in the ideal case of a dialogue.
On a second dimension, we can differentiate between information and persuasive communication: While transparency means access to information, political institutions might want to set the public agenda in order to show that the issues they deal with are relevant. Furthermore they might want to communicate their opinion using instruments of political marketing such as symbolic communication appealing to emotions or they might choose to publicly justify their policies by rational argumentation. Whether an information policy rather follows the model of propaganda or dialogue obviously matters for a democratic public sphere. Citizens will be empowered by a transparent polity and political institutions pro-actively presenting their projects in public before the decision-making. The electorate has a better chance to cast an intelligent vote, when justifications are given instead of a merely symbolic representation of the political process. The following section will apply this analytical framework in order to explore the information policy of the European Commission.
Figure 1: Seven Strategies of Information Policy
Towards a Change of Paradigm
"The ignorance or lack of understanding typical of the public's relationship with the European Union is not inevitable. It is due largely to the complexity of the European process but also to the absence of an EU information and communication policy on the part of both the European insti-tutions and the Member States." Information Strategy for the European Union (COM (2002) 350
final, 7)
The quote above suggests, that there was no information policy before 2002 which is of course not true since even the act of deliberately refraining from any action is a policy decision. Following the framework established above, this policy of not informing the public may be called "arcane policy". This used to be the predominant model for the European Communities information activities. These are mainly executed by the European Commission which will therefore be in the centre of the analysis.
Jean Monnet as Proponent of Arcane Policy
When Emanuelle Gazzo founded the news service "Agence Europe" in 1954, Jean
Monnet is said to have demanded that Gazzo should immediately stop this undertaking (Cf. Gramberger 1997, 100). Gramberger describes the history of the Commission's information policy from Monnet to Santer as one from trying to silence the public to trying to start dialogue. It seems that the first approach was more successful than the latter. The Commission was quite efficient in managing European integration in silence and later on it failed to reach out to the citizens as practically all research on the topic concludes (Cf. Gramberger 1997; Mak 2001; Meyer 1999; Schlesinger 1999) . The technocratic approach of integration seems to have started a vicious circle of (non-
The public, the media and politics are caught in a self-enforcing circle of lack of interest to read, write and talk about EU matters. 23 At the same time economic and political integration proceeded and public opinion tolerated the transfer of more and more competences to the European level. This "public consensus" (Lindberg / Scheingold 1970) actually might still exist in many EU countries. Open protest against the EU still is the exception. It is apathy towards the EU which is common among citizens.
Democratic procedures such as referenda and voting for the parliament, however, do not demand this kind of consensus but a minimum of activation -one that many people are not ready to deliver. 24 In this context the public sphere comes into play as a forum for political mobilization.
23 Norris (2000) assumes that there is a "virtuous circle of political communication": The media offer more and more information to those who are interested. The increasing knowledge, she assumes will eventually also spread to the wider public. 
The Beginning of the End of Arcane Policy
The beginning of the 90s marks the beginning of the end of the phase of European arcane policies. The trigger for going public was the European Parliament, but not in the way to be expected, that a parliament sets off public discussion processes. Instead the EP caused worries about the European citizens who refused to vote for Europe. The first reactions were symbolic measures of European consciousness formation starting already in the mid-eighties (see above "Cultural Policy"). These measures belong to the strategy of political marketing which prefers symbolism to argumentation in order to convince people. Normatively, such measures are questionable since they rather seduce citizens than empower them. At the same time, any nation state uses the same means to strengthen its identity.
Information policy became really important for the first time with the ratification problems attached to the Maastricht Treaty: the Danes had rejected the treaty and the referendum in France was nearly lost. While the Commission was blamed for the problematic ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by the national governments, the Commission's internal scapegoat was failed information policy (Gramberger 1997, 224) . 25 In response, the Commission produced the De Clercq Report which developed a marketing strategy for the European Communities. At the conference where the report was presented, journalists are reported to have "walked out in disgust" (Mak 2001, 47/48) , as they conceived the strategy as propagandistic and following the logic of commercial publicity. The new Commissioner Pinheiro responsible for information formulated his own alternative approach which stressed the principles information, communication and transparency and condemned propaganda while the basic idea of persuasive communication, i.e. the wish to convince the citizens of the benefits of integration, was not abandoned. Pinheiro's report presented a number of ideas with the aim to make information part of any political project of the Commission. According to Gramberger (1997, 230ff) , Commissioner Oreja who succeeded Pinheiro in office showed no interest in implementing the reform.
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In the course of the 90s the information policy of the EU offered a mixed picture. Elements of all strategies presented above co-exist. However, a change of paradigm on information policies might be under way: Proof of this are a number of new instruments and procedures which show a more pro-active, professional and transparent approach towards information.
More Transparent Politics and New Instruments of Information Policy
The Commission offers insight into its agenda and policies through Green and White Information material is distributed through more than 500 Documentation Centres with official documents, Info Points Europe in more than 140 cities, three "Grands Centres d'Information" (Paris, Lisbon, Rome) and 129 rural Information Centres spread all over Europe. 28 The launch of the web site EUROPA 29 in January 1995 was indeed a "quantum leap" towards transparency (Kleinsteuber / Loitz 2001, 103) . The citizens do not even have to visit a documentation centre in order to have access to practically all documents which the Commission considers as "public". In addition to these decentralized information relais, there is the central Q&A -service "Europe Direct" which responds to questions of the citizens and adds to the transparency of the work of the institutions. While all of this basically comprizes measures which allow access to information, they do not reach out to those who do not care about the EU and therefore do not visit "www.europa.eu.int", nor call "Europe Direct". 26 Usually there was no Commissioner exclusively responsible for information. Therefore it was often regarded as an additional duty of lower importance (Research Interview with Commission Official).
Agenda-setting, Justification and Marketing through PRINCE
The quantitative and qualitative leap in the direction of pro-actively communicating policies came with the "Priority Information Programs for the Citizens of Europe" The additional budget provided for the first Prince program was the same amount as the whole budget of the Directorate General responsible for information at that time (Gramberger 1997, 260) . This "sea change in the Commission`s approach to dissemina- These campaigns range somewhere in between the strategy of agenda setting (as they want to create awareness for the main projects of the Union), political marketing and public justification (as they want to convey the benefits of the EU for the citizens both by argumentation and symbolic measures).
The main innovation of the latest Prince campaigns, namely on the Euro, was that the The fact that dialogue has been a prominent catch-word in all papers on information that the Commission has edited within the last years leads Mak to the conclusion, that "it is nothing more than a Dialogue on Dialogue" (2001, 79) -the same conclusion that
Gramberger drew four years before (1997, 266) . The possibility of a dialogue which is not only instrumentally used does by definition only arise if political projects are communicated before the major decisions are taken. This is why today the Commission might explain the project of EU enlargement but it cannot seriously start an open dialogue about it. So in this regard all promises were bound to be broken.
Strategy-searching after the scandal of 1999
The change of the Commission towards a more open and pro-active information policy was halted in 1999 when the Commission tried to deal with its corruption scandal by mobbing the critical journalists (cf. Meyer 2002), leading to an aggrevation of the crisis.
Meyer argues that the resignation could possibly have been avoided with a different : The Commission would rather sit down with citizens and discuss its policies than just distributing a leaflet.
The effects of such a paper may be more limited than the rigour of its content sug- Commissioner solely responsible for information. Again the issue is declared a priority but this time, the conditions seem much more favourable that this will actually lead to changes on how the EU reaches out to the people. Member states' governments seem to be willing to cooperate on this issue. In 2004 two ministerial conferences were organized by the Irish and the Dutch presidency on the issue of "communicating Europe" -something that had never happened before.
32 Cf. Raupp who criticizes the Commission's instrumental approach to communicating its policies which conflicts with genuine dialogue (Raupp 2004, 236) .
Relicts of Arcane Policy
Beneath this turn towards transparent governance relicts from the days of arcane policy prevail. The transparency regime of the Commission still offers loop holes and due to a lack of a comprehensive register of all documents one cannot easily ask for the documents not published on the web. 33 The Commission still is haunted by its bureaucratic culture and Council negotiations partly still take place in secrecy, thereby making it difficult to hold national politicians responsible for what they do "in Brussels". The information policy remains structurally weak, as it still lacks a legal basis. The upcoming constitution will not change this. One sentence is missing: "The Institutions inform the citizens about the activities of the Union". Alejo Vidal-Quadras, co-chairman of the Interinstitutional Group on Information (IGI) for the European Parliament, wrote an open letter to Giscard proposing to put this sentence into the constitution. The proposal did not make it into the final draft of the constitution. Maybe the appropriate sentence would rather read: "The institutions and the member states inform the citizens about the activities of the Union." The Commission has stressed that it is mainly the member states' task to explain European policies towards their citizens. In the field of information policy the Commission seems to have realized that by claiming too much responsibility, it risks to be blamed for failing to inform citizens about Europe. Last but not least, the representations of the Commission complain to lack the personel for a more pro-active work with the press. Due to this lack of personel they were not even able to spend all the money that could have been available for communication.
The analysis has shown that we find examples of all strategies of information policy.
The 
VICIOUS OR VIRTUOUS CIRCLE OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION?
The new instruments used in the context of the Prince campaigns as well as the general tenor of practically all recent policy documents on the issue hints at a change of paradigm in the way the EU treats information (see figure 2) . Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go towards open and transparent governance and backlashes such as the corruption scandal may always occur. The review of the EU's activities in the field of media, culture and information has shown that the EU is trying to influence all dimensions identified by research on the Europeanization of the public sphere which were listed earlier in this article: 1. Information campaigns aim at more talk about the EU. 2. By pursuing strategies of agenda setting they attempt to make people discuss the same topics at the same time. 3. By framing topics in the same way and trying to activate the same networks in all member states, EU information policies hint at developing similar camps and frames in national debates in different countries. 4. A European public ("we") is promoted with cultural
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-20 -and language policies. 5. Information material and the press work of the Commission foster the transnational circulation of certain arguments in all EU countries. 6. A rising effort is put into helping transnational media such as Euronews. 7. Transnational speakers are present in the form of the EU-personnel itself but the EU also mobilizes speakers who are willing to talk on European topics from a European perspective ("Team Europe").
Looking at the last two decades, a comprehensive study of the quality press in five countries has just come to the conclusion: There is a Europeanization of public spheres, but they remain segmented as each national paper pays more attention to the EU's institutions and policies, albeit transnational discursive exchange between national public spheres is not intensifying Brüggemann et al. 2005) . At the same time, the citizens knowledge of and interest in the EU still is very low in spite of all efforts described above.
This leaves questions for further research: To what respect is the political activity analysed above really relevant to this evolution of the EPS? Have the EU policies contributed to reverse the vicious circle of non-communication mentioned above? Are media, political actors and audience dragged into a virtuous circle of political communication?
We observe a change towards a more democratic information policy, but its effectiveness might be called into question. Obviously, there is no linear cause and effect mechanism but one that is dynamic, full of feedback processes and with the permanent presence of adverse effects: The attempt of Santer's PR people to silence the scandal in 1999 lead to a mobilisation of journalists who were now more than ever interested in writing something about the EU. In the end this might be as effective for vitalizing the public sphere as all planned information campaigns. The sheer existence of information campaigns does not mean that they do have a significant effect or primarily the effect intended. To assume that they have no effect at all would be equally naïve. Long-term and rather subliminal effects might be expected that are worthwhile further examination.
